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JUDGING, POLITICS, AND
ACCOUNTABILITY: A REPLY TO
CHARLES GEYH
Susan Bandest
Charles Geyh bravely takes on the overused, under-theorized no-
tion of judicial accountability. He endeavors to bring substance and
clarity to this phrase, which he correctly observes is often used as
little more than a poorly defined "flip side" for judicial independence.
As he observes, there is a danger that in defending judicial independ-
ence from inappropriate influences, reasonable people will lose sight
of-or at least fail to articulate-the appropriateness and indeed im-
portance of holding the judiciary to certain standards and values.'
Geyh properly recognizes that judicial accountability, like judicial
independence, is an instrumental value, and that both are ultimately
designed to improve the administration of justice. He argues that ac-
countability promotes the rule of law, public confidence in the courts,
and the judiciary's responsiveness to the public it serves.2 Though, as
he notes, the precise articulation of instrumental ends can be debated,3
all of the forgoing are essentially uncontroversial.
In service of his goal of explicating a notion of the appropriate
scope of judicial accountability, Geyh does two things. First, he sug-
gests a taxonomy that he hopes will facilitate a more precise, less
rhetorical discussion of the scope and purposes of accountability. He
suggests that judicial accountability can be usefully divided into three
categories: institutional, behavioral, and decisional.4 Second, he ar-
t Distinguished Research Professor, DePaul University College of Law. I wish to thank
the editors and faculty advisors of the Case Western Reserve Law Review for organizing and
inviting me to participate in this timely and fascinating symposium on judicial accountability
and independence. I am also grateful to David Franklin, Barry Friedman, and Stephen Siegel for
helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article.
I Charles Gardner Geyh, Rescuing Judicial Accountability from the Realm of Political
Rhetoric, 56 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 911, 911-15 (2006).
2 Id. at915-16.
3 Id. at 915.
4 Id. at 917.
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
gues that decisional accountability--or at least sanctions for deci-
sional error-should be reserved for situations in which the error is
intentional. With the laudable aim of clarifying and limiting the uni-
verse of situations in which judges will be held accountable for errors
in decision-making, Geyh proposes a rebuttable presumption that
most decisional error is unintentional. 5 He argues that the key to de-
termining what judicial conduct ought to lead to sanctions is to "dis-
tinguish simple disagreements as to applicable facts and law, for
which direct political accountability is inappropriate, from deliberate
usurpations of political power, which are properly subject to sanc-
tion,"6 and he suggests some guidelines for doing so.
My remarks will focus on two interrelated concerns about Geyh's
paper. First, I fear that his taxonomy is not well designed to "rescue
judicial accountability from the realm of political rhetoric ' 7 because
the taxonomy both overstates the demarcation among the types of
accountability it lists and fails to adequately define the underlying
notions of "politics" and "activism" so essential to his argument. The
second concern, which follows from the first, centers on Geyh's at-
tempt to defend sanctions for certain types of decisional misconduct,
or for judicial forays into "politics." In short, I think this attempt is
doomed to failure.
My concerns about Geyh's argument begin with his description of
the instrumental purposes of accountability: promotion of the rule of
law, of public confidence in the courts, and of judicial responsiveness
to the public. These purposes, without more, are too indeterminate to
take us beyond the realm of rhetoric. To bring any determinacy to
their definition requires the instantiation of values that are
unavoidably political. The rule of law promotes consistency and
transparency, which are worthy goals, but which, in our system, must
coexist with other values, such as fairness and substantive justice.
Any debate about the scope of the rule of law-the extent to which it
circumscribes discretion or evolution of doctrine-is in essence a
debate about the proper scope of the judicial role. The latter two
purposes-public confidence and responsiveness to the public-raise
obvious questions about the counter-majoritarian role of the courts.
Public confidence is good-we want courts to deliver not only justice
but the appearance of justice-but as I will discuss, it is not
necessarily correlated with the kinds of courageous decision-making
we often wish to encourage. And the question of how responsive
5 Id. at 928-29.
6 Id. at 915.
7 Id. at 914.
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judges should be to the public is basically a variant of the activism
question: how do we delineate the realm in which judges may
override majoritarian preferences?
I find Geyh's proposal problematic for several overlapping rea-
sons, all of which spring from my essential disagreement with his
assumptions that the legal and the political are distinct entities in our
constitutional scheme and that improper judicial activism is an activ-
ity that can be usefully defined and even controlled. At the outset, the
lack of definition creates a problem for Geyh's taxonomy. Without a
theory for what counts as "political" in the sense of "inappropriately
nonjudicial," it is difficult to evaluate whether willful disregard of the
law should be characterized as "a deliberate usurpation of political
power" or whether sanctioning such acts will further accountability's
proper purposes.
My second objection to Geyh's taxonomy is that it attempts to dis-
cuss the judicial role in the aggregate, without sufficient concern for
the differences between Article 1H1 and non-Article 111 courts, between
lower courts and appellate courts, and between all other courts and
the Supreme Court. Geyh mentions this problem briefly,8 but I think it
is more profound than he acknowledges. The requisites of the judicial
role-behavioral, institutional, and decisional-are in many respects
a function of the type of judicial power that is being exercised. Geyh
recognizes that state and federal judges are subject to different en-
forcement mechanisms, but the more basic point is that the nature and
scope of the judicial power differ in different contexts. Thus, the
meaning of exceeding the judicial power-and encroaching on the
political realm-will differ as well, as will the nature and viability of
any proposed reforms or sanctions.
STATE COURTS
Geyh refers to judicial elections as "the elephant in the parlor of
state judicial accountability." 9 I think it fairer to say that judicial elec-
tions, where they are used,' ° are the parlor. Or, to borrow another
zoological/household metaphor, as late California Supreme Court
8 Id. at 918-19.
9 Id. at 924.
10 It is difficult to report precise statistics because several states use a variety of methods
depending on the type of judgeship or a combination of methods. But, in a 2002 concurring
opinion, Justice O'Connor noted that "39 states currently employ some form of judicial elec-
tions for their appellate courts, general jurisdiction trial courts, or both." Republican Party of
Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 790 (2002) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing the American
Judicature Society's report, JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE STATES: APPELLATE AND GENERAL
JURISDICTION COURTS (2002)).
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Justice Otto Kaus colorfully put it, judicial elections are the "croco-
dile in [the] bathtub" of the judicial consciousness.1 In many re-
spects, they establish the rules of the game, create barriers to reform,
and exercise an effect, which Geyh and I seem to agree is mainly
deleterious, 12 on institutional, behavioral, and decisional accountabil-
ity. Indeed, they call into question whether these categories are suffi-
ciently helpful or distinct. Moreover, elections pose a unique set of
challenges to those who would like to keep politics out of the courts
and the courts out of politics.
The word "politics," like its close companion, the term "activist,"
is a moving target, and many of its possible meanings come into play
in this discussion. Perhaps in common parlance, as in the claim that
judges or those who determine their appointment should not "play
politics," the term is used to connote party or partisan politics-
politics meant to advance the agenda of a particular party or
candidate. Of course, politics encompasses far more and need not be
derogatory. Politics, ideologies, and theories of governance and
interpretation shade into one another. We might say, for example, as I
have elsewhere, that Justice Brandeis had a judicial philosophy in
which his "respect for the constraints of judging coexisted with his
conception of substantive justice, a conception that was infused with
his deeply held Progressive values." 13 We could speak about low
politics and high politics; a coarse reduction that at least has the virtue
of simplicity.
Politics, both high and low, operate in both state and federal
courts, at every level, but in different ways. Or as Kathy Abrams
nicely put it, "The compromises of integrity that can occur in the
funding of judicial elections, and their aftermath, are so stark that they
baffle those of us who are accustomed to more theoretical problems
of adjudication, such as the 'countermajoritarian difficulty."",14 In
state courts, where judges have no life tenure or salary protection, and
particularly in those courts where judges must stand for election, par-
tisan political influences are a pervasive aspect of judicial life. As
Justice O'Connor recently observed, judges subject to regular elec-
tions "cannot help being aware that if the public is not satisfied with
the outcome of a particular case, it could hurt their reelec-
HId. at 789 (quoting Justice Kaus).
12 See Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Elections Stink, 64 OHIO STATE L.J. 43 (2003)
(criticizing, sharply, judicial elections).
13 Susan Bandes, Erie and the History of the One True Federalism, 110 YALE L.J. 829,
837 (2001) (book review).
14 Kathryn Abrams, Some Realism About Electoralism: Rethinking Judicial Cam-
paign Finance, 72 S. CAL. L. REv. 505,505 (1999).
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tion prospects."' 15 As she further notes, "contested elections generally
entail campaigning, ' 6 and "campaign donations may leave judges
feeling indebted to certain parties or interest groups."'
17
Capital punishment places this issue in sharp relief. In this arena,
the political pressures tend to run strongly in one direction: toward
rendering and upholding a sentence of death. There can be immediate
consequences for the judge who bucks this trend, whereas there are
generally few consequences, either internal or public, for those who
conform, even at the expense of due process and fairness. There is
empirical evidence that this risk has a deleterious impact on judicial
decision-making. Steve Bright and Patrick Keenan cite evidence that,
at a time when judges could impose the death penalty by overriding a
jury recommendation, elected judges were far more likely to do so
than judges who did not face reelection. 18 Jim Liebman and his
coauthors, in the landmark study A Broken System, found, "The more
political pressure imposed on judges by a state's method of
selecting-which usually means electing-judges, the higher is the
risk that capital trial verdicts imposed in the state will be seriously
flawed."' 9
If we assume that this state of affairs is highly unfortunate, and in-
deed antithetical to the justice values that ought to animate any stan-
dard of judicial accountability, we might consider whether Geyh's
approach helps identify or address the problem. Consider the Texas
state courts and their approach to capital cases. Texas has no state-
wide public defender system. Each county is free to set its own rules
for providing counsel to indigent capital defendants. In many coun-
ties, judges appoint private attorneys to individual capital cases. A
recent study found that although judges did consider competence and
familiarity with the applicable law, "[n]early half of the
judges... report that their peers sometimes appoint counsel because
they have a reputation for moving cases, regardless of the quality of
the defense they provide and a comparable number.., indicate that
the attorney's need for income influences the appointment deci-
sion."20 Even more troubling, the study found that
15 Republican Party of Minn., 536 U.S. at 789 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
16 id.
17 Id. at 790.
18 Steven B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death: Deciding Be-
tween the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. REV. 759, 793-94
(1995).
19 JAMES S. LIEBMAN ET AL., A BROKEN SYSTEM, PART In: WHY THERE IS SO MUCH
ERROR IN CAPITAL CASES, AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT 397 (2002), available at
http://ccjr.policy.net/cjedfund/dpstudy/liebman2.pdf.
20 ALLAN K. BUTCHER & MICHAEL K. MOORE, MUTING GIDEON'S TRUMPET: THE CRISIS
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[p]ersonal and political factors also play a role in the ap-
pointment process. Nearly four in ten. . . judges indicate that
their peers occasionally appoint an attorney because he or she
is a friend, while roughly one-third of judges sometimes con-
sider whether the attorney is a political supporter ... or has
contributed to their campaign . . . .As a defense attorney
from Harris County noted, "I have been refused appointments
because I cannot afford to give money to the judge's reelec-
tion campaign .. .those attorneys who contribute the most
money receive the most work.
' 21
Note the seamless way in which the threats to institutional, behav-
ioral, and decisional accountability merge. Judges appoint attorneys
based on factors either irrelevant or inimical to the goals of a just sys-
tem. They look for attorneys who will not take too long on a case or
ask for too much in the way of experts and other costly and time-
consuming indicia of competent defense work, thus compromising the
integrity of the adversary process. They also create a barely disguised
system of legalized bribery--contributions in exchange for appoint-
ments. Indeed, there seems little incentive to disguise it. There is no
indication that judges are held accountable for conduct that reflects
poorly on their own integrity and impartiality and on the administra-
tion of justice in capital cases. Its most noticeable effect is to swell
campaign coffers.
In short, if we agree that the Texas system cries out for reform, I
would argue that the problem here is not merely one of lack of deci-
sional accountability. There is a failure in that regard, of course, but it
is part and parcel of a greater failure and, moreover, the decisional
failures themselves do not fit neatly into the category of "intentional."
Of course, I am not suggesting that intentional misconduct can
never be identified or targeted. I have long practiced law in Chicago,
which has had more than its share of out-and-out corruption and brib-
ery, dating back to the earliest years of machine politics. 22 In the early
1980s, Operation Greylord, a probe of judicial corruption in Cook
County, led to the conviction of fifteen sitting judges and seventy-
nine other court personnel.23 The reform commission established in
IN INDIGENT CRIMINAL DEFENSE IN TEXAS 12 (2002), http://www.uta.edu/pols/moore/indigent
last.pdf.
21 Id. at 13.
22 See PAUL CHEVIGNY, EDGE OF THE KNIFE: POLICE VIOLENCE IN THE AMERICAS 120-
121 (1995) (discussing history of pervasive machine-style political corruption of the criminal
justice system).
23 Jim Edgar, Voting for Judges Intelligently, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 23, 2000, at 14.
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the wake of Greylord in 1985, proposed a move to merit selection, a
reform the major bar associations have been proposing in vain since
1952.24 It "took note of the 'particularly corrosive effect' of campaign
fund-raising by judges under the elective system., 25 The contributions
come primarily from lawyers likely to appear before the judges; the
money flows even in uncontested elections. The reform that came
from Greylord, as Chicago author and reporter Steve Bogira sums it
up, is that while Greylord "may have reduced the practice of lawyers
slipping money to judges ... it's still perfectly legal, and customary,
for lawyers to pass money to judges through their campaign commit-
tees. 26 And judges are well aware of who gave, and how much.27
Here, the values Geyh identifies-the rule of law, public confi-
dence in the courts, and institutional responsibility-seem severely
compromised in ways that his taxonomy fails to capture. Politics, in
the "low" sense-partisan politics-infect the process through means
that are difficult to isolate or address. Ironically, the elections that are
such a large part of the problem are supposed to act as their solution
as well.28 Cook County's experience in this area is not encouraging.
Voters choose judges with little regard for their abilities and nearly
every judge is retained, even those who receive failing marks from
every bar association that provides ratings. 29 In the rare instances
where judges are not retained, usually an unpopular decision on a hot
button issue-such as a decision too solicitous of the due process
rights of a defendant-is the trigger.30
24 See STEVE BOGIRA, COURTROOM 302: A YEAR BEHIND THE SCENES IN AN AMERICAN
CRIMINAL COURTHOUSE 321-22 (2005) (comparing the traditional election of judges to a non-
partisan merit-selection system).
25 Id. at 322.
26 Id.
27 Id.; see also Abrams, supra note 14, at 517 (noting that because of disclosure require-
ments adopted by most states, "judges know precisely who has contributed to their campaigns
and how much").
28 See, e.g., Geyh, supra note 1, at 924 (pointing out that "judicial elections can serve to
hold judges accountable in ways that keep faith with all three objectives of judicial
accountability").
29 See Joseph R. Tybor, Reawakened Voters Rise To Oust 3 Judges, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 6,
1986, at 3 (noting that prior to the 1986 retention election, only four judges had been "kicked
out of office by voters since the first retention election in 1966").
30 In 1986, Cook County Circuit Judge Lawrence Passarella became one of the few judges
to lose a retention vote, after he rendered a widely reported and hugely unpopular not-guilty
verdict against a defendant who had severely beaten a female police officer. See Mike Royko,
Cops' Verdict on Judge Already In, CHI. Thin., Oct. 24, 1986, at 3 (noting the influential col-
umnist's approval of a movement, organized by police, to "dump Passarella"); Tybor, supra
note 29, at 3 (reporting on Judge Passarella's defeat at the polls). The best known example of
this dynamic is the defeat of several anti-death penalty members of the California Supreme
Court in 1986. See Abrams, supra note 14, at 515.
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This latter point suggests some of the limitations of Geyh's notion
of decisional responsibility. The most obvious point is that public
reaction to decisions is an extremely poor measure of whether those
decisions follow the law or deserve censure. Indeed, there may be an
inverse correlation between the type of conduct that elicits negative
public reaction and that which deserves censure (for example, police
misconduct generally must be egregious before a judge will allow it
to interfere with a conviction in a high profile case: such a decision is
usually a mark of judicial courage). But the more basic problem is
with Geyh's desire to separate intentional from unintentional failures
to follow the law. As the examples above suggest, the sorts of inten-
tional errors that are easy to identify tend to fall into the category of
criminal conduct.3' As to the rest, even if they could or should be
identified, they are part of a larger problem.
In the Illinois state courts, for example, judges tend to share a few
salient characteristics. Most of them owe their jobs, at least in part, to
their political organization, which means both that they are grateful to
its members, and that they have worked for the organization for a
long time and are likely identified with its goals and values. In addi-
tion, many of them are former prosecutors or police officers. These
characteristics shape the judges' world view. I have written exten-
sively, for example, about why it was that so many Illinois judges-
on every level-seemed unable to see, much less act upon, what was
ultimately shown to be a longstanding pattern of police torture of mi-
nority suspects on Chicago's South Side.32 Judge after judge denied
motions to suppress confessions alleged to be the product of torture or
failed even to conduct hearings to determine whether allegations of a
shocking pattern of police torture were well founded. As I have de-
tailed elsewhere, the grounds for these decisions tended to be flimsy
at best.33 Bogira recounts one such ruling in his book: Judge Locallo,
a former prosecutor, rejected Leroy Orange's bid for a hearing on
torture allegations because Orange had filed inconsistent affidavits. In
one affidavit he claimed "he'd been struck in the mouth, kicked,
shocked with needles in his buttocks and anus, and bagged, and that
his testicles had been squeezed. 34 But in a more recent affidavit, he
31 Indeed, Geyh notes that intentionality may be virtually impossible to prove absent "evi-
dence of bribes or favoritism." Geyh, supra note 1, at 935.
32 See, e.g., Susan Bandes, Patterns of Injustice: Police Brutality in the Courts, 47 BUFF.
L. REv. 1275 (1999).
33 Id. at 1294-96.
34 BOGIRA, supra note 24, at 285.
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no longer claimed he had been kicked. 5 Nearly all these rulings were,
at least initially, affirmed by the appellate court.
Did all these judges intentionally flout the law? Geyh offers sev-
eral possible motives for intentional decisional error, including finan-
cial gain, favoritism, and political, racial, or cultural bias. No doubt
many of these were at play in the police brutality decisions. The
judges were likely exercising selective empathy toward law enforce-
ment officers and exhibiting a lack of empathy toward the generally
marginalized criminal defendants who were accusing them of horrific
acts. 36 For reasons that are partly racial, cultural, and class-based, they
may have found it easier to understand and believe the officers than
the defendants. The fact that a ruling against law enforcement could
only hurt their chances of reelection would only reinforce these un-
conscious biases-perhaps even assure the judge that he was indeed
being responsive to the public. But the law is shot through with such
biases, and rarely do they operate on an intentional level.
My point is not that any of the characteristics I have just described
are inevitable, and certainly not that they are desirable. There are re-
forms that might address many of these shortcomings,3 but many of
them are politically infeasible. 8 Rather, my point is that many of the
factors that render these judges insufficiently accountable, and that
create formidable barriers to reform, cannot be generalized to the fed-
eral system, and are not well described by Geyh's taxonomy.
FEDERAL COURTS
Few issues have been as well mined as the parameters and ambi-
guities of Article HI and the tensions inherent in the role of Article I
courts in a scheme of separated and divided power. As Larry Kramer
and John Ferejohn recently summed up the landscape, Article m1
seeks to protect the independence of individual judges while situating
them "within an institution that is exposed and vulnerable to a wide
array of controls by the political branches.,, 39 These controls unavoid-
35 Id.
36 See Bandes, supra note 32, at 1321 n.289 (discussing reasons why judges may identify
with accused torturers rather than their victims).
37 See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 14, at 524-28 (discussing a number of proposed reforms).
38 See Kermit Hall, Perpetuating the Judiciary: The Judicialization of Public Life and the
Independence of the Judiciary in American History, Keynote address at the meeting of the
Conference of Chief Justices and the Conference of State Court Administrators, Salt Like City,
Utah (July 25, 2004) (transcript available at http://cosca.ncsc.dni.us/Perpetuating-Kermitt.pdf)
("The good news is that these ideas have considerable merit. The bad news it that they haven't a
chance.").
39 John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary:
Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 962, 977 (2002).
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ably expose the courts to politics both high and low, to influences
both ideological and starkly partisan. Politics play a role in the com-
position of the federal courts,4° in oversight of the courts,41 and in
shaping the courts' jurisdiction.42 The nature of that role is endlessly
argued, but not the fact of it. The confirmation hearings on Justice
Samuel Alito were an exhibition of both partisan and ideological in-
fluences in action and an illustration of the difficulties of distinguish-
ing the two. It is within the context of the complex and delicate
scheme of divided power that we must consider Geyh's question:
"how does one distinguish simple disagreements as to applicable facts
and law, for which direct political accountability is inappropriate,
from deliberate usurpations of political power, which are properly
subject to sanction? ' '43 Putting aside for the moment the question of
whether intent should be relevant, what does it mean to usurp political
power in this context?
There is a vast gap between the public discourse on this topic and
the accepted realm of scholarly debate. For an example of the stan-
dard public discourse, consider the response of Judge Edward Becker
of the Third Circuit to revelations that Judge Alito had written memo-
randa stating his "passionate belief that Roe v. Wade ... should be
overturned." 44 Judge Becker said, "People don't understand what
happens to you when you become a judge. When you take that oath,
you are transformed. You are a different person. You have a solemn
obligation to be totally impartial and fair.",45 Judge Alito concurs; he
has repeatedly stated that he has "no agenda," and that "the judge's
only obligation ... is to the rule of law, [which means that] in every
single case, the judge has to do what the law requires."46 Yet it is
40 See Terri Jennings Peretti, Does Judicial Independence Exist? The Lessons of Social
Science Research, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS 103, 104-09 (Stephen B.
Burbank & Barry Friedman eds., 2002) (discussing the pervasive role of politics in judicial
selection).
41 As a recent example, the Feeney Amendment to the Amber Alert law requires federal
judges to file a report when they hand down sentences lower than those created by the federal
sentencing guidelines and allows Congress access to those reports without permission of the
presiding judge. See Ian Urbina, New York's Federal Judges Protest Sentencing Procedures,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2003, at B 1.
42 See Charles M. Cameron, Judicial Independence: How Can You Tell It When You See
It? And Who Cares?, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 40, at 134,
139 (discussing the political effect of congressional assertions of control over the federal
courts).
43 Geyh, supra note 1, at 915.
44 Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Nominee Says His Views on Abortion Would Not Affect His Deci-
sions, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2005, at A16.
45 Id.
46 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. To Be an Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States Before the S. Comn On the Judiciary, 109th
Cong. 56 (2006) (opening statement of Samuel Alito).
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fairly uncontroversial among legal scholars to say, as Kramer and
Ferejohn do, "Like it or not, a judge's choice of methodologies and
his or her exercise of discretion are imbued with an inescapably po-
litical dimension ...."4 In his foreword to the 2004 Supreme Court
term, Judge Posner, discussing the category of "open" constitutional
cases in which no authoritative text or precedent controls, flatly
states:
Constitutional cases ... are aptly regarded as 'political' be-
cause the Constitution is about politics and because cases in
the open area are not susceptible of confident evaluation on
the basis of professional legal norms .... [I]t is rarely possi-
ble to say with a straight face of a Supreme Court constitu-
tional decision that it was decided correctly or incorrectly.48
Of course, as Judge Posner implies, different institutional rules
govern appellate courts, and Geyh asserts that his proposal is directed
primarily at the lower courts.49 We might say with more confidence
that an inferior court flouted precedent. Perhaps we might say this
about the Fifth Circuit, for example, which had to be directly told by
the Supreme Court on two occasions that it could not uphold a par-
ticular jury instruction in a death penalty case.50 But this sort of mis-
behavior is unusual; most deviations are much harder to identify. In
fact, as Barry Friedman points out, the top-down model that assumes
lower courts simply follow the mandate of the Supreme Court-and
that any deviations from that mandate are improper-is incomplete
and misleading. 51 Lower courts also operate in the "open area," as
Judge Posner calls it, much of the time.52 That is, lower courts have
significant interpretive leeway. Compliance with precedent may not
dictate a particular outcome. 3 The top-down notion is incorrect in an
additional way-the lower courts' interstitial interpretations may in-
fluence the shape of doctrine in the Supreme Court. 54 Moreover, as to
47 Ferejohn & Kramer, supra note 39, at 974.
48 Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court 2004 Term-Foreword: A Political Court, 119
HARV. L. REV. 32,40 (2005).
49 Geyh, supra note 1, at 933-34.
50 See Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 284 (2004) (reversing a Fifth Circuit case which
upheld a capital jury instruction identical in all relevant respects to that the Supreme Court had
earlier struck down in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989), and holding that the standard
applied by the Fifth Circuit had "no foundation in the decisions of th[e] Court").
51 See Barry Friedman, The Politics of Judicial Review, 84 TEX. L. REv. 257, 295-308
(2005).
52 See Posner, supra note 48, at 40.
53 Friedman, supra note 51, at 300-01.
54 See id. at 304 (discussing how the Supreme Court may alter its constitutional doctrine
to ensure lower-court support and, thus, compliance with the Court's decision).
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the vast majority of lower court cases, we will simply have no defini-
tive way of knowing whether deviations have occurred because no
reviewing court will weigh in on the issue.
Friedman points to a significant body of work by political scien-
tists supporting the claim that ideology plays a role in the outcome of
lower court federal decisions.56 Some of these studies suggest that the
political party of the President who appointed the judge is highly pre-
dictive of how this ideology affects the judge's decisions.57 Along
these same lines, Jim Liebman's study of reversible error in capital
cases provided evidence that "the probability that a capital verdict
will be reversed on final federal review seems to be related to whether
review is by judges mainly appointed by Republican presidents or by
judges mainly appointed by Democratic presidents. 58 In short, even
life tenured judges do not float free of political influences-both high
and low. 59 Certainly Geyh is correct that "law still means something
to judges";60 the point is that judges apply the law in light of an ideo-
logical framework and that framework may not be easy to distinguish
from their personal values or political preferences.
As to the Supreme Court in particular, what is an example of a de-
cision "in which the judges have willfully disregarded the law and
imposed their own personal values or political preferences? '61 Geyh
argues that Kramer and Ferejohn's argument that judicial independ-
ence fosters "a decision-making process in which cases are decided
55 To illustrate, the lower federal courts have long relied upon the obscure Rooker-
Feldman doctrine as a primary docket clearing device. The expansive version of the doctrine
these courts used bore little resemblance to the original doctrine explicated by the Supreme
Court, but since the Court had almost nothing to say about the case from 1983 to 2005, the
courts had ample room to improvise. See generally Susan Bandes, The Rooker-Feldman Doc-
trine: Evaluating Its Jurisdictional Status, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1175 (1999). Whether the
Court's recent pronouncement on the scope of the doctrine, Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic
Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005), will rein in the lower courts remains to be seen.
56 Friedman, supra note 51, at 300-01.
57 Id.
58 LIEBMAN ET AL., supra note 19, at 398.
59 For an example of a federal judge apparently caving in to direct political pressure, see
the opinions of Judge Harold Baer of the District Court for the Southern District of New York in
United States v. Bayless. Compare U.S. v. Bayless, 913 F. Supp. 232, 242-43 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(holding that police had no reasonable suspicion to stop an alleged drug trafficker, opining that
running from police in that area of the Bronx was not unusual because "residents of this
neighborhood tended to regard police officers as corrupt, abusive and violent," and, ultimately,
suppressing evidence seized during the stop), with U.S. v. Bayless, 921 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y.
1996) (vacating the previous opinion on reconsideration on the grounds that reasonable suspi-
cion did exist, granting the suppression motion, and apologizing for hyperbolic language in the
first opinion-an opinion that drew outraged reactions, including calls for Judge Baer's im-
peachment or resignation, from several highly placed government officials). See generally Don
Van Natta, Jr., Judges Defend a Colleague from Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, March 29, 1996, at Bl.
60 Geyh, supra note 1, at 934.
61 Id. at 915.
[Vol. 56:4
JUDGING, POLITICS, AND ACCOUNTABILITY
on the basis of reasons that an existing legal culture recognizes as
appropriate" supports by negative implication an inference that judges
may be sanctioned for "decisions that fall outside the boundaries of
what the legal culture regards as appropriate." 62 I read these scholars
as arguing, instead, that as a broad matter, one purpose of judicial
independence is to maximize the chances that judges will reach deci-
sions that fall within these boundaries.63 And at the Supreme Court
level, judges need the latitude to fall outside those boundaries on oc-
casion. Robert Post eloquently explained that "the Court has been
known to gamble on what it perceives to be the future development of
American political vision, and it has been known both to inspire and
to misjudge the nation.' 64
The obvious recent candidate for a deliberate usurpation of politi-
cal power, a willful imposition of personal values, is Bush v. Gore.
65
Indeed, some have argued not only for the impeachment of some of
its authors, but for their criminal prosecution. 66 A much greater num-
ber of scholars have suggested that there is evidence of just the sort of
intent Geyh seeks to target. The case seems tailor-made for the appel-
lation "disingenuous power-grab. 67 Therefore, it might be helpful to
examine the critiques of the decision and see whether Geyh's pro-
posed taxonomy sheds light on how it should be evaluated and what
consequences it should engender. Is an intent standard workable or
advisable for determining the imposition of sanctions?
The overarching critique about Bush v. Gore is that the majority
decision was partisan in the lowest sense of the term, unsupportable
as a matter of principle or precedent, and understandable only as a
vehicle for ensuring a victory for one litigant-George Bush. As
many have noted, it is difficult to imagine the case coming out as it
did had the candidates' positions been switched.68 In this sense, the
decision violated the rule of law in its most basic sense. As Peggy
Radin put it:
[I]nstead of deciding the case in accordance with preexisting
legal principles, fairly interpreted or even stretched if need
62 Id. at 926 (citation omitted).
63 Ferejohn & Kramer, supra note 39, at 969-70 ("The principle underlying judicial inde-
pendence calls for hindering political pressures of every kind, from any source, if they would
interfere with a well-functioning judiciary by distorting its decisionmaking process.").
64 Robert Post, Sustaining the Premise of Legality: Learning To Live with Bush v. Gore, in
BUSH V. GORE 96,98 (Bruce Ackerman ed., 2002).
65 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
66 E.g., Vincent Bugliosi, None Dare Call It Treason, THE NATION, Feb. 5, 2001, at 11.
67 Geyh, supra note 1, at 915.
68 E.g., Bugliosi, supra note 66.
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be, five Republican members of the Court decided the case in
a way that is recognizably nothing more than a naked expres-
sion of these justices' preference for the Republican party.69
Others have stated the problem in less measured tones. Lawyer
Vincent Bugliosi said the following:
The stark reality ... is that the institution Americans trust the
most to protect its freedoms and principles committed one of
the biggest and more serious crimes this nation has ever
seen-pure and simple, the theft of the presidency.7°
Though legal scholars tend to stop short of Bugliosi's demand for
criminal indictment, they nevertheless describe a rupture that is well
outside the normal boundaries of bad decision-making. Jed
Rubenfeld, for example, calls his article "Not as Bad as Plessy.
Worse., 71 He describes both the majority decision and the concur-
rence as "indefensible., 72 Robert Post says the opinion "seemed to
undermine the very practice of constitutional adjudication. '73 He
notes that the justices had the potential for a grave conflict of inter-
ests-in that the President nominates Supreme Court justices-and
that their resolution of this case gave at least the appearance of im-
propriety. 74 Louise Weinberg says that when the Court becomes pre-
maturely involved in the electoral process, "the Court not only attacks
our republican form of government, and our democracy, but also the
powers of the political branches, and the independence of the future
judiciary., 75
In short, Bush v. Gore, in the eyes of many respected legal
scholars, exemplifies the worst case scenario that Geyh describes. It is
an example of a violation of institutional and decisional norms that
compromises the rule of law, threatens or breaches the separation of
powers, casts a shadow on the integrity of the Court, and undermines
public confidence in the Court as an institution. Yet what is striking
about the scholarship on the case is how reluctant scholars are to
delve into judicial intent or motive.
69 Margaret Jane Radin, Can the Rule of Law Survive Bush v. Gore?, in BUSH V. GORE,
supra note 64, at 111, 114.
70 Bugliosi, supra note 66, at 12.
71 Jed Rubenfeld, Not as Bad as Plessy. Worse, in BUSH V. GORE, supra note 64, at 20.
72 Id. at 29.
73 Post, supra note 64, at 100.
74 Id. at 102.
75 Louise Weinberg, When Courts Decide Elections: The Constitutionality of Bush v.
Gore, 82 B.U. L. REv. 609, 665 (2002).
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Rubenfeld does assume intentionality in several respects. On the
issue of the Court's "deference" to the Florida Supreme Court's al-
leged decision that December 12 was the cutoff date for the recount,
he accuses the Court of pretending the Florida court had thus decided
and of "making up" the deadline.76 Of the equal protection ground on
which the Court ultimately rested its holding, he calls the Court's
reliance on this ground "suspicious," based on the Court's attempt to
confine the holding to that case alone, the fact that it showed no con-
cern for the many other similar or worse inequalities in vote counting
occurring in the same election, and the disparity between the principle
enunciated and the previously stated convictions of those who enun-
ciated it.77 Yet he repeatedly disclaims any intention to impugn or
even inquire into the majority's motives.78 He concludes by saying:
[I]n the hearts of most justices is a desire to see their views
made into law and to see the law they have made carried for-
ward after they are gone, not in dissenting opinions, but in the
opinions of the Court. This desire-entirely aside from any
crude considerations of partisanship--can exert a deep and
improper influence when the justices undertake to decide a
presidential election. It might make them intervene on thin or
indefensible grounds .... All this could happen without the
slightest subjective bad faith.79
Bugliosi, who does claim bad faith, and who would like to see the
majority justices indicted, points to much of the same evidence, argu-
ing that it shows an "unmistakable consciousness of guilt on their
part.",80 He mentions the stay that stopped the recount on the legally
insupportable ground that it cast a cloud on what Bush claimed to be
the legitimacy of his election; he mentions the ultimate reliance on an
equal protection argument on which the Court had previously denied
certiorari, the indefensible holding on the December 12 safe harbor
date, the language attempting to limit the holding to the present case,
and the judges' departure from their own previously held convictions
on federalism, equal protection, and other matters of constitutional
principle.8'
We are unlikely, let us hope, to see a case in which a stronger ar-
gument for bad faith or scienter can be made. Is it, then, possible to
76 Rubenfeld, supra note 71, at 26.
77 Id. at 20-29.
78 Id. at 27, 37.
79 11 at 37.
80 Bugliosi, supra note 66, at 13.
81 Id.
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resolve these scienter issues in any consistent way? Even if it is, is the
game worth the candle? I do not think we want to develop a body of
law considering when individual judges' decisions are insufficiently
consonant with their settled convictions. (I am also curious how such
rules would apply to justices outside the majority opinion-should
their culpability turn on whether at least four other justices join
them?)
Finally, what should the remedy be if bad faith can be shown?
Geyh's paper never makes clear what remedy he advocates for inten-
tional decisional malfeasance. It is not always obvious whether he is
making claims about what is done, what can be done, or what ought
to be done. He argues, as he has elsewhere, that there exists a zone of
judicial independence customarily observed by Congress. 2 He argues
that norms around impeachment and court-stripping, for example,
reflect an unwillingness to interfere with judicial decision-making. I
would like to suggest that historical and current practice regarding
court-stripping and impeachment, and in other areas as well, do not
provide strong support for Geyh's argument.
First, Geyh underestimates the amount of court-stripping Congress
has recently accomplished. Moreover, the court-stripping provisions
that have been enacted do not appear to address prior decisional error,
whether ill motivated or not.83 They appear to address dissatisfaction
with the volume of litigation generated by judicial review in certain
substantive areas. Perhaps not coincidentally, the groups they deprive
of judicial review-such as immigrants and prisoners-tend to have
little political clout.
As to the history of impeachment, Geyh argues that this history,
and specifically the Senate's refusal to impeach or convict based
solely on errant decision-making, supports a rebuttable presumption
that such decisions are made in good faith and should not be grounds
for impeachment.8n Although it seems uncontroversial that we have
established a custom against impeachment for good-faith errors, I
would further argue that history cannot be read to offer any support
for a presumption in favor of impeachment for ill-motivated deci-
82 Geyh, supra note 1, at 919 (noting that "Congress has traditionally afforded the courts
considerably greater branch independence than the text of the Constitution requires"); see also
Charles Gardner Geyh, Customary Independence, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE
CROSSROADS, supra note 40, at 160, 160-61 (arguing that judicial independence must be de-
fined in terms of congressional norms in addition to constitutional considerations).
83 See Vicki C. Jackson, Congressional Control of Jurisdiction and the Future of the Fed-
eral Courts-Opposition, Agreement, and Hierarchy, 86 GEO. L.J. 2445, 2445-46 (1998) (citing
several laws restricting the jurisdiction and remedial powers of the federal courts across a range
of litigation brought by prisoners and immigrants).
84 Geyh, supra note 1, at 915.
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sional errors either, unless they rise to the level of criminal conduct.
The first successful impeachment and conviction of a federal judge-
that of Judge John Pickering of the New Hampshire federal district
court-shows the difficulty of drawing conclusions from the Senate's
actions. Though (or indeed because) Pickering was, in the words of
historian Richard Ellis, both "hopelessly insane" and an alcoholic, the
Senate faced a dilemma in determining whether he possessed the in-
tent to violate his oath of office.85 Ellis concludes, "The partisan and
contradictory manner in which the trial was conducted has prevented
the Pickering impeachment from ever being considered a strong
precedent for anything. ''86 With no record of the Senate's reasoning,
we cannot know why Samuel Chase was not convicted. We know
only that he made several arguments, but not which of them was ac-
cepted; one argument that persuaded at least some senators was that
impeachment and conviction should be reserved for criminal con-
duct.87 For Ellis, the most important explanation was that the acquittal
was the product of conflict between moderate and radical Republicans
for control of their party.88 In the aftermath of these early cases, we
seem to have established a tradition in which impeachment is re-
served for criminal conduct. Any conclusions about history's lessons
for non-criminal errors in decision-making can only be speculative.
In any case, I am sure Geyh would agree that there are few well
settled legal barriers to impeaching judges or stripping them of deci-
sional power-or to doing so for reasons having nothing to do with
intentional decisional error. The Court has held challenges to the judi-
cial impeachment process nonjusticiable. 89 As to the question of
whether a decision is so far beyond the pale that it implies a judge's
individual bad faith, Congress and the Court have dealt with this issue
by granting absolute immunity, broadly defined, to judges. Indeed, it
did so in a case involving the unnecessary, nonconsensual, secret,
entirely ultra vires sterilization of an adolescent girl.9°
Geyh is also making a normative argument about when sanctions
ought to be imposed, though he never specifies what sorts of
sanctions he would consider appropriate. For example, what sanctions
would he recommend for the members of the majority-or the
85 RICHARD E. ELLIS, THE JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS 70-75 (Norton 1974) (1971).
8 Id. at 74.
87 Id. at 102.
88 Id. at 103.
89 Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 237 (1993) (holding that challenges to judicial
impeachment process are non-justiciable political questions).
90 See, e.g., Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 364 (1978) (upholding grant of absolute
immunity to judge who ordered the unjustified nonconsensual sterilization of a teenage girl in
an ex parte proceeding despite the fact that the order exceeded his jurisdiction).
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concurrence-in Bush v. Gore? And what is the significance of the
fact that an argument for any such sanctions can never be more than
entirely hypothetical? Bush v. Gore, in my view, shows the futility of
targeting individual decisional misfeasance. Like the problems I
earlier discussed with state court accountability, the problem at the
heart of Bush v. Gore is institutional and, therefore, unavoidably
political. The Constitution situates the appointment and discipline of
federal judges, as well as oversight of the federal courts, in the
political realm. We hope that the conduct of the judges on the bench
will "rise above" politics, and perhaps each of us knows what we
mean when we say that, but no consensus is possible. The only
absolutes are that the political process will continue to play out, that it
will do so in the context of shifting national values and assumptions,
and that the parameters of acceptable judging will be shaped and
reshaped as a result.
